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Abstract 
 
This article considers the resistance potential of Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) and their effects upon existing power relationships. It 
focuses upon the blocking of Eskom’s proposed new test nuclear reactor by 
the environmental NGO Earthlife Africa, at Koeberg, South Africa, the site of 
Africa’s only existing nuclear power plant. This was achieved through their 
engagement with, and contestation of, the South African EIA process. It 
occurred within a context of a globally uncertain future for the nuclear industry, 
and broader questions over the possible role of nuclear power in sustainable 
development. Whilst initially appearing as an example of environmental 
resistance against a big development project, by approaching the case 
through the lens of Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality the article 
suggests that Earthlife Africa’s challenge reinforced existing power 
relationships and legitimised an essentially pro-development EIA process. 
This is particularly evident when considering the relationship between EIAs 
and established scientific authorities, and the problematic role of public 
participation. However, by regarding the EIA as an example of ‘bearing 
witness’ some sense of its resistance potential can be reclaimed. The article 
concludes by suggesting that a broader debate on nuclear power in South 
Africa is desirable, and that environmental NGOs should seriously consider 
the degree to which they accept and participate in the EIA process. 
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Resisting (nuclear) Power? Environmental 
Regulation and Eco-Governmentality in South Africa 
 
 Environmentalists are commonly regarded as presenting a counter-cultural 
critique in all sorts of ways: in their rejection of a modernist domination of nature, 
their questioning of capitalist wealth and growth, their exposure of the inability of 
sovereign nation-states to deal unilaterally with global environmental problems, and 
their enthusiasm for environmental regulation of the free market (Hajer and Fischer, 
1999; Mason, 2005). Since their introduction in the USA in the 1970s, environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs) have emerged as a significant form of environmental 
regulation in numerous countries, and as such are frequently presumed to act as a 
constraint upon economic expansion or development, and thus as a tool of resistance 
against neo-liberal capitalist hegemony (Annandale and Taplin, 2003; Lawrence, 
1997). Furthermore, their stress upon popular participation also implies an element of 
radical democracy, and a potential challenge to the power of entrenched elites (Eden, 
1996). At first sight the case examined in this article seems to confirm the status of 
EIA as a potential technique of resistance. The environmental NGO Earthlife Africa 
used the EIA process to block the development of a new nuclear Pebble Bed Modular 
Reactor (PBMR) by Eskom, South Africa’s energy giant, at the existing Koeberg 
nuclear site, 30km north of Cape Town. A straightforward good versus bad, David 
versus Goliath story seems self-evident here. In the context of South African 
environmentalism however, and the broader nuclear debate, the issues become more 
complicated. Furthermore, by approaching this case from a Foucauldian perspective, I 
argue that EIAs are a technique of eco-governmentality, and as such are 
fundamentally compatible with, rather than opposed to, the development process. By 
showing how their reliance upon scientific experts and public participation can both 
challenge and reinforce existing power relationships, this article complicates a 
simplistic identification of EIAs as a technique of resistance. It concludes by 
considering the notion of bearing witness, and through this reassesses the potential 
resistance capacity of the EIA process.  
 
 
Earthlife Africa versus Eskom  
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 The African continent’s first and only nuclear power plant was built at 
Koeberg in the 1970s by a French-led consortium, and began operation in 1984. In 
March 1993 President de Klerk admitted that South Africa had built six nuclear 
weapons during the 1980s (Fig, 2004). It seemed that both nuclear power and atomic 
weapons were closely identified with the apartheid regime, and the ANC stated in 
1994 that ‘the nuclear industry should be phased out in the shortest possible time’ 
(quoted by Lakhani, 2002: 2; and Worthington, 2000: 5). In the late 1990s however 
nuclear development programmes were back on the agenda, with Eskom’s plans to 
test the new PBMR technology at Koeberg, for eventual industrial export. 
Environmentalists have been dismayed by this possibility, and have voiced suspicions 
that South Africa is being ‘asked to support the international revival of the nuclear 
industry through a costly experiment with public money’ (Fig, 2004: 6). This also 
seemed to contradict hopes that South Africa would become a leading example of 
environmentally friendly sustainable development in the global South. 
In 1994 there was much optimism that democracy would lead to a racially 
harmonious, economically prosperous and environmentally sustainable Rainbow 
Nation (Cock, 1991). The new constitution enshrined citizens’ right to a healthy 
environment, and EIAs, as set out in the 1998 National Environmental Management 
Act (NEMA), became mandatory for most major developments. However, in the 
context of continued massive inequality and poverty, the environmental agenda has 
often lost out. Trade unions, for example, have been beset by a long-standing ‘jobs 
versus environment’ dispute, in which environmental gains are typically set against 
job losses (Lukey, 2002). The team responsible for devising EIA procedures for South 
Africa noted that the specific form of assessment adopted was heavily influenced by 
the fact that ‘as in most developing countries, the promotion of economic growth and 
development are essential national goals in South Africa’ (Sawman, Fuggle and 
Preston, 1995: 53). When combined with a perceived historical continuity between 
racist apartheid conservationists, and the largely white, middle-class environmental 
lobby in South Africa, environmentalism occupies a controversial and contested 
terrain (Khan, 2002). 
It was in this context that an EIA was conducted on Eskom’s proposal to build 
a new test reactor at Koeberg. EIAs are conducted by consultants employed by the 
developer, who present their report to the South African Department for 
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Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) for final approval. In this case Eskom 
appointed a panel of 13 consultants, including representatives from Poltech, Netrisk, 
Afrosearch, Nuclear Consulting International, Andersen, and Africon, to work on the 
scoping phase during 2000 and 2001, and the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) 
phase, which was completed in June 2003 when the Report was approved by the 
Director-General of DEAT (Poltech, 2002: xvii). The scoping phase sets out the 
nature and extent of the proposed development, considers possible alternatives, 
gathers background information on the local area, identifies and provides information 
to interested and affected parties (I&APs), and records their comments and concerns 
(Wood, 1995: 5 – 6). When the scoping report was approved by DEAT the 
consultants began the EIR phase, which involved studies of the social, economic, 
biophysical impacts and technical aspects of the development, and also incorporated 
comments by the I&APs.  
The final 435-page Report concluded overall that it ‘identified no significant 
environmental risk(s) or adverse impact(s) in part or on the whole that cannot be 
adequately managed and mitigated over the life of the Plant’ (Poltech, 2002: xxvii). 
Specifically, it concluded that the information provided by the test PBMR would help 
guide future strategic decisions on the use of the technology, and would potentially 
help broaden the national energy mix for electricity supply (xx). It noted that the 
development did not necessarily conflict with local and regional energy policy, but 
that these policies needed clarification (xxi). There was a ‘pressing’ need for ‘a 
national policy on management of radiological waste’, but the Report concluded that 
its absence ‘does not represent a fatal flaw’ (xxi – xxii). The consultants asserted that 
‘no radiological impacts exceeding the standards stipulated by the NNR [National 
Nuclear Regulator] have been found’, and that the greatest potential adverse impacts 
would occur during the construction phase, necessitating a construction 
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) (xxii). There was also a need for an 
operational EMP, to cover radiological surveillance programmes, disaster 
management systems and Eskom’s HIV/Aids policies (xxii – xxiii). The Social 
Impact Assessment, conducted by Afrosearch, highlighted the importance of risk 
assessment and perception, and concluded that the absence of ‘a coherent national 
nuclear energy policy’, or particularly a ‘national policy regarding the disposal of 
nuclear waste’, contributed to a ‘dread risk perception’ (xxiv). There was therefore a 
need for better and non-biased information from both the pro- and anti-nuclear lobbies, 
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and better communication between Eskom, the government and the public (xxv). The 
EIR also noted the need to maintain and upgrade Tygerberg Hospital’s ability to cope 
with nuclear incidents and disasters (xxv). Economically, it concluded that the PBMR 
would provide 1,400 local jobs during construction and 40 permanent jobs, would 
support the national goals on science and technology, and would ‘have limited 
transient negative impact upon tourism’ (xxvi). The cumulative impacts would mainly 
concern the nuclear High Level Waste being stored on-site, but in general these 
impacts would fit into Koeberg’s existing nuclear footprint. The EIR therefore 
recommended that, subject to authorisation from the NNR, the implementation of the 
EMP, and financial provision for waste storage and plant decommissioning, DEAT 
should approve the development (xxvii). 
In June 2003 DEAT issued its formal Record of Decision (ROD), which fully 
endorsed the EIA process, the conclusions of the EIR, and approved the development 
(Olver, 2003). However, there was opposition from NGOs and individuals to both the 
PBMR proposal and the way the EIA process itself had been conducted. Leading the 
opposition was Earthlife Africa, a non-profit, voluntary environmental organisation. 
In September 2003 their Cape Town branch formally challenged Eskom and the 
PBMR development through the law courts, beginning a High Court application to 
overturn the ROD, primarily on procedural grounds. In November 2004 the judge 
found in favour of Earthlife Africa, and set aside the ROD, ruling that the EIA process 
was ‘procedurally unfair’ (Griesel, 2005: #58 and #76). Despite losing a subsequent 
court case over access to Eskom’s board minutes, and the initiation of a new EIA by 
Eskom for an expanded PBMR in 2005, Earthlife Africa have, at least temporarily, 
halted the PBMR development. The delays to the development, and the wider 
challenge to the project, have had considerable economic costs, both in terms of 
operational delays and in discouraging potential investors (Thomas, 2004: 11). 
This legalistic challenge was the tactical form of Earthlife Africa’s opposition 
to Eskom, but it was within the context of an attempted broader debate over nuclear 
power in South Africa. Opposition to the PBMR has drawn upon the strength of the 
environmental justice discourse in South Africa, which unites environmental concerns 
with social justice goals, and engages enthusiastically with the participatory 
opportunities offered by the EIA process (McDonald, 2002). Earthlife Africa describe 
themselves as ‘environmental and social justice activists’, and their approach stresses 
that environmentalism is more about people’s lives, than it is about nature and 
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wildlife in isolation.1 The environment, as expressed by the founder of South Africa’s 
Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF):  
 
includes our workplace, home, hostel, town, village and city as well as areas of 
natural beauty. Thinking of the environment in these broad terms makes it clear that 
South Africa’s high infant mortality rates, industrial accidents, road and mining 
accident deaths, violence and township pollution are all environmental issues (quoted 
in Cock, 2004: 7). 
 
This discourse draws attention to the many ways in which the risks and damages 
associated with environmental degradation disproportionately impact upon the 
economically and socially disadvantaged – for example during debates over the 
location of the dump for Koeberg’s nuclear waste in 1979, consultants looking at 
Namaqualand ruled out areas less than 50km removed from white settlements, 
although there are indigenous villages (such as Paulshoek) located within 24km of the 
Vaalputs site they eventually selected (Fig, 1991: 124). As with civil rights 
movements, this discourse has often campaigned through legal-activist attempts to 
uphold constitutional rights. In South Africa, the Bill of Rights enshrines the right of 
people ‘to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being’, and it is 
this, together with the legal requirement to conduct EIAs and consult those affected 
by developments, that has encouraged environmental justice groups like Earthlife 
Africa to contest developments like the PBMR (Glazewski, 2002). Groups drawing 
upon this discourse have expressed their opposition to the PBMR most prominently in 
terms of safety concerns and over the dubious economic benefits of the technology.  
Eskom proudly states that ‘the PBMR does not require any of the traditional 
nuclear safety systems that actively guard older generation reactors against radiation 
release’, and that it is ‘inherently safe’.2 However, this assurance has been publicly 
questioned, especially given that the last operational reactor of this type, in Germany, 
was ‘closed on the orders of the safety regulator’ (Worthington, 2000: 10). Earthlife 
Africa have called for ‘a full independent review of the plant’s status and safety’ 
based on ‘grave concerns’ highlighted by their own technical review (Earthlife, 2004). 
This was in part prompted by several incidents at the existing Koeberg nuclear plant 
which have raised doubts about Eskom’s safety record, and company policy on 
liability and disclosure of accidents. In 1998 The Cape Times uncovered a radiation 
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accident in 1997 that had been concealed (Worthington, 2000: 14). The case of Ron 
Lockwood also reached the national media. He is a former worker at Koeberg who 
was diagnosed with advanced lymphatic leukaemia several years after being 
persuaded to take early retirement. He subsequently uncovered evidence that, as early 
as 1986 (ten years before retiring), Koeberg medical officers had known of his 
condition, and had falsified official medical records (EJNF, 2004b). Most recently, 
damage caused by a loose bolt to one of the reactor turbine blades in December 2005 
led to the enforced shutdown of one of the two Koeberg reactors, contributing to 
power shortages and blackouts in the Western Cape (Mining Weekly, 2006). This 
incident encouraged questioning of not only the safety but also the economic and 
technological reliability of nuclear power.  
The profitability of the nuclear power industry has been in doubt ever since its 
emergence, and many environmentalists have expressed frustration with the way 
nuclear energy continues to absorb disproportionate amounts of state funding. In 
South Africa, nuclear development programmes consumed two thirds of the 
Department of Minerals and Energy’s annual budget in 1997, but only generated 
about 5% of the national electricity supply. This is in a country where, by the end of 
2000, only 70% of households were connected to the grid (Bond, 2002: 310 – 333). 
Despite this, the PBMR is designed for its eventual industrial export potential, rather 
than for domestic power generation. Eskom have defended the development claiming 
‘tens of thousand of permanent jobs will be created through the multiplier effect if the 
export potential of the PBMR is realised’, but the permanent workforce at the module 
will only be 40 – 50 people.3 Furthermore, foreign investors seem reluctant to provide 
funding for the project. The EIR referred to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, even after they 
had effectively pulled out of the project due to their own insolvency (Poltech, 2002: 2). 
The American giant Exelon withdrew funding for the project, arguing that the PBMR 
was three years behind schedule ‘and that the whole project was too speculative’, and 
other US investors have been almost impossible to attract after the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission refused to approve the PBMR, stating in 2001 that its design 
was ‘seriously flawed’ (Fig, 2004: 60 – 61). This means that the bulk of the risk is 
being borne by the South African tax-payer. Independent academic research 
concludes that the current PBMR demonstration module ‘will inevitably be a heavily 
loss-making project’, and emphasizes the significant risks of the project, given the 
doubtful world market for PBMR technology (Thomas, 2004: 4 – 5 and 29 – 33). 
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Whilst Earthlife Africa tried to raise these issues, it was made clear by the 
judges during the court case that ‘our decision does not express any opinion as to the 
merits or demerits of the proposed PBMR, in particular, nor of nuclear power in 
general’ (Griesel, 2005: #79). Environmental groups in South Africa who have called 
for a parliamentary ‘nuclear summit’ to debate these broader questions have not been 
successful.4 The court case therefore rested upon particular bureaucratic arguments 
regarding EIA procedure, with Earthlife Africa arguing that EIA law had not been 
properly followed. The broader challenges posed by the environmental justice 
discourse were not addressed. Whilst this form of resistance was successful in halting 
the reactor, at least for the time being, it becomes more problematic when considered 
in the light of its implications for existing power relationships, and when the 
relationship between power and freedom is re-theorized. 
 
 
Eco-governmentality 
 
Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ has been influential in re-
theorising the links between political power, domination and resistance (Foucault, 
2000a; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1999). It takes as its starting point the assertion that 
political power defines the extent to which ‘some men can more or less entirely 
determine other men’s conduct – but never exhaustively or coercively’ (Foucault, 
2000b: 324). For Foucault, power is everywhere, and constitutes relationships 
between individuals. Power produces society, forms of knowledge, institutions and 
even our own identities. Power is thus not merely repressive, nor is it a normatively 
good or bad concept. Yet there are various types of power relationships – ranging 
from the fluid, shifting relationships that exist between individuals, to the sedimented, 
coercive relationships that characterise domination. In between these extremes are 
forms of power Foucault describes as techniques of government, established systems 
for regulating the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1997a: 298 – 299). These techniques 
of government have been referred to as manifestations of governmentality, or the 
rationality of government.  
This concept draws attention to the numerous ways in which conduct is 
regulated – through our internalization of certain roles (such as the economically 
rational individual, or the responsible citizen) and the advice of authoritative experts, 
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in order to render society efficient, safe and productive. Therefore, for Nikolas Rose, 
freedom and government are mutually dependant within traditional Liberal political 
thought, since ‘to dominate is to ignore or to attempt to crush the capacity for action 
of the dominated. But to govern is to recognize that capacity for action and adjust 
oneself to it’ (Rose, 1999: 4). This view of power, freedom and government has 
implications for the way we conceive of resistance, in particular rendering concepts 
like emancipation and liberation problematic. Since power is productive and 
everywhere, and government works through freedom, a power-free utopia is clearly 
impossible. Thus resistance in this article implies simply an unsettling or challenging 
of existing power relations (Darier, 1999). 
Foucault’s exposition of the concept of governmentality was primarily 
concerned with the way the government of a population – its security, reproduction, 
productivity and stability – became a concern of the nation state (Foucault, 2000a). 
However, the concept has been extended both spatially and in terms of scope (Larner 
and Walters, 2004). The concept of ‘eco-governmentality’ has been used by both 
Timothy Luke and Michael Goldman to describe the ways in which nature and the 
environment is governed by techniques of ruling from a distance (Luke, 1995, 1999b; 
Goldman, 2001). Here I will use the term eco-governmentality to describe the ways in 
which nature is managed, regulated and governed in order to guarantee its security, 
reproduction, productivity and stability.  This rationality can be seen in John Locke’s 
modernist assumption that ‘land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no 
improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste’ (quoted 
by Kuehls, 1996: xii). 
Eco-governmentality works through identifiable techniques and tactics, such 
as EIAs. These forms of power are productive in that they discursively articulate ‘the 
environment’ through acts of measurement, regulation, valuing, and control. For 
example, EIAs seek to define a particular, bounded ‘environment’, analyse its 
‘baseline’ characteristics, and predict and control changes to it (Wood, 1995: 6; 
Poltech, 2002: 204 and 213). As Paul Rutherford asserts, ‘regulatory ecological 
science does not so much describe the environment as actively constitute it as an 
object of knowledge and, through various modes of positive intervention, manage and 
police it’ (Rutherford, 1999: 56). Furthermore, EIAs rely heavily upon 
governmentalising strategies such as scientific consultants who frame the study, and 
by eliciting public participation. They are not therefore repressive, since they seek to 
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elicit citizen involvement in order to manage nature more efficiently and rationally, 
but they do seek to regulate conduct through expert knowledge. The mutual 
interdependence of the expert and public participation is characteristic of a 
governmental rationality, since to be free is ‘to be bound to those engineers of the 
human soul who will define the norm and tutor individuals as to the ways of living 
that will accomplish normality’ (Rose, 1999: 76). 
When considered as a form of eco-governmentality therefore, EIAs seem less 
obviously a tool of resistance against a modernist, economic development mindset, 
than a key technique of modern methods of regulating the conduct of conduct, notably 
through their reliance upon authoritative experts and the internalization of government. 
The following sections will investigate the ways in which the Koeberg EIA process 
both reinforced and unsettled existing power relationships. 
 
 
The scientific expert 
 
The science of environmental management is increasingly pervasive in the 
global development industry, and most obvious in the worldwide proliferation of 
EIAs.5 An EIA is carried out by environmental management consultants, ‘members of 
private professional firms who are hired to look after the EIA process and report its 
findings’, using scientific, technological, geographical and risk assessment methods 
(EJNF, 2004a: 9). In this case a consortium of consultancy firms were involved, who 
investigated the development’s predicted economic, social, biophysical impacts and 
technical aspects, and formulated an Environmental Management Plan to control and 
mitigate impacts (Poltech, 2002: xv – xvii and 396). The process is often championed 
as an example of objective scientific enquiry that can independently report upon the 
impact of a development. The EIR noted that it operated on the principle that ‘the 
truth is told at all times even where this involves bad news’ (xxv).  
However, during the November 2004 court case, the judge agreed with 
Earthlife Africa’s claim that: 
 
although Eskom’s consultants were notionally ‘independent’ in the sense that they 
were not institutionally part of Eskom, they were employed by Eskom to act as its 
agent and the purpose of their engagement was to obtain the authorisation Eskom 
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sought ... The consultants were, in other words, clearly aligned on Eskom’s side and 
were not independent consultants employed by the decision-maker to assist him in 
making his decision (Griesel, 2005: #70). 
 
This judgement casts doubt on the objectivity of almost all EIAs worldwide, since it is 
normal procedure for the developer to hire the consultant. EJNF advise government 
and local communities that they should ‘not rely unquestioningly on the independence 
of the consultant’ (EJNF, 2004a: 11), and an Earthlife Africa activist, Muna Lakhani, 
observed that the ‘statistically impossible zero no-go recommendations’ that EIAs 
return in South Africa suggests that consultants are not really independent (Lakhani, 
2001: #4). The structural difficulties of achieving an objective and independent 
process when the consultants are being paid by the developers are considerable, as 
Michael Goldman concludes based on his analysis of World Bank environmental 
assessments, where there is ‘an enduring and comfortable relationship between the 
loan managers and the project’s reviewers’, and ‘it is never easy to get support for a 
long-term study unless investors are certain there will be a project at the other end’ 
(Goldman, 2001: 196 – 200). Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that Maurice 
Magugumela, the Chief Executive Officer of the South African NNR (the body 
responsible for setting industry nuclear safety standards), has been a long-term 
employee of Eskom and the PBMR’s safety and licensing manager. 
 Arguably even more significant than the close institutional relationship 
between particular consultants, developers and government, are the scientific 
assumptions at the heart of the EIA process which condition the scope, framework 
and nature of the assessment. This can be seen in the Koeberg EIA’s failure to 
seriously discuss the role of nuclear power in South Africa’s energy policy, the 
broader economic context, alternative technologies, or the disposal of radioactive 
waste.6 One of Earthlife Africa’s contentions against the Director-General of DEAT, 
Crispian Olver, in the November 2004 court case was that ‘he failed to properly 
address the problems posed by nuclear waste and he abdicated responsibility to 
properly consider safety issues by deferring to the national nuclear regulator’ (Griesel, 
2005: #77). Olver had previously defended this restricted scope, claiming ‘it is not the 
job of an impact assessment to deal with the question of whether South Africa should 
pursue nuclear energy, nor is it in my ambit to decide on matters of nuclear safety’ 
(quoted by Gosling, 2003). The health impacts of the development were based upon a 
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survey of international literature, and safety and security information submitted by 
Eskom to the NNR was not made available in the EIR (Poltech, 2002: 57 and 126 – 
133). Approval for the Eskom development was given despite the absence of a 
national policy on the management of radioactive waste – a startling example of 
scientific hubris and blind faith in progress (Olver, 2003: 1). Furthermore, it was 
alleged that alternatives such as renewable energy were not actively considered, and 
that their viability was ‘misrepresented’ by senior Eskom representatives in public 
meetings (Worthington, 2000: 27; Fig, 2004: 65). Even more surprisingly, attempts to 
independently assess the economic viability of the development were frustrated by 
Eskom, who ‘continually refuse to answer questions on the programme’, stating that 
the EIA covered only the PBMR demonstration phase, not the long-term economic 
prospects (Thomas, 2004: 4, 8 – 10, 14).  
In general, the overly technocratic scope of EIAs is a frequent weakness, with 
Peter Ngobese and Jacklyn Cock targeting the South African process in particular for 
‘a serious neglect of social impacts’ (Ngobese and Cock, 1995: 265). Lakhani alleges 
that ‘socio-economic issues, health and attendant costs, etc, are generally ignored’ by 
EIAs in South Africa, and only a narrow definition of ‘the environment’ is applied 
(Lakhani, 2001: #26). Many criticisms of EIAs address their project-specific focus, 
and their inability to consider the effects of cumulative developments (Burns and 
Canter, 1997). 
This is hardly surprising since, particularly in the context of the South African 
development priorities noted above, EIAs are designed to facilitate rather than block 
projects. Those responsible for the South African form of EIA state that rather than 
‘focussing on the negative aspects associated with the proposal’ the process should 
emphasize ‘the positive aspects of the proposal, identifying appropriate mitigatory 
measures … Furthermore, only key issues should be investigated to avoid costly 
delays required to investigate and prepare lengthy reports’ (Sawman, Fuggle and 
Preston, 1995: 53 – 54). This view, of EIAs serving to facilitate development, was 
evident in the South African Government’s reaction to the court decision delaying the 
PBMR: ‘the result of which is that the country’s development programme will be 
hamstrung, in a manner that could undermine good intentions of ensuring that 
environmental concerns are taken into account’ (DEAT, 2005). There is a thinly 
veiled threat here, warning against any environmental obstruction of the PBMR 
nuclear development. 
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These institutional and structural factors clearly pose significant limitations to 
scientific objectivity. However, they do not necessarily compromise the basic 
principles of EIA – since presumably the process could always be improved. However, 
Foucault’s notion of eco-governmentality draws attention to the way knowledge is 
always implicated in power relations, indeed ‘there is no knowledge without a 
particular discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the 
knowledge it forms’ (Foucault, 2002: 210). The science of environmental 
management is at the heart of the EIA process, and like all forms of knowledge it 
works to exclude and diminish alternative knowledges, and reinforces established 
power relationships between ‘experts’ and ‘non-experts’ (Wynne, 1996: 45). Those 
involved with the South African EIA process have criticized the overly technical 
language of documents, and note that the responsibility rests with the public to ask for 
more time, find and pay for their own consultant if they cannot understand the 
information submitted by the developer’s consultants (Lakhani, 2001: #9; EJNF, 
2004a: 7). During the Koeberg EIA it was alleged that ‘communities in the vicinity of 
nuclear installations were never fully informed of proposed developments in their own 
languages and in a manner appropriate to their levels of literacy’ (Fig, 2004: 65).  
Moreover, especially when considering complex situations and risks that 
evade normal sensory perception (such as dangerous radiation levels or the risk of 
nuclear meltdown), we become entirely dependant upon scientific measurement (Beck, 
1992: 162). In the Koeberg EIA the refusal to consider the possible health impacts of 
the development on local communities was based upon Eskom’s assertion that ‘no 
credible scientific correlation has been established between health effects and the 
routine operation of commercial nuclear facilities anywhere in the world’ – which 
Earthlife Africa disputed with their own scientific evidence and expert testimony 
(Earthlife, 2004). The EIR concluded that ‘epidemiological study and health 
monitoring of the public for the proposed Plan is not recommended or required’ 
(Poltech, 2002: xiii – xiv). Despite some serious qualms, local health authorities have 
relied upon Eskom’s scientific testimony and no epidemiological studies on the local 
population have ever been carried out (Fig, 2004: 34). For the sociologist Ulrich Beck, 
being forced to accept science’s premises in order to contest scientifically induced 
hazards leads to a ‘Kafkaesque experience of protest’ which is like arm-wrestling 
oneself (Beck, 1995: 60). The hegemony of modern science is such that there is a 
‘political and cultural demand for scientific rationality’ in decision-making, and 
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alternative forms of rationality are frequently ignored or devalued (Eden, 1996: 190).  
Brian Wynne draws attention to the ways in which ‘lay knowledge’ is ‘inadvertently 
but still systematically suppressed’ by expert knowledge – and uses as his example 
public concerns over health risks arising from living adjacent to the Sellafield nuclear 
plant in the UK (Wynne, 1996: 46 – 49). Similarly, in the Koeberg case, safety 
concerns brought forward by Earthlife Africa and EJNF were discredited as anecdotal 
and unscientific when compared to the lack of a universally and scientifically 
established causal relationship between nuclear facilities and health effects (Earthlife, 
2004; EJNF, 2004b). The EIR starkly characterises positive reactions to the proposed 
development as ‘responses that show a strong leaning to logic (as opposed to emotion) 
and a pragmatic acceptance of statistical and calculated risk assessment based on 
historic real risk’, implicitly devaluing negative reactions to the development by 
labelling them as irrational (Poltech, 2002: 89). Beck argues that ‘non-acceptance of 
the scientific definition of risks is not something to be reproached as irrationality in 
the population; but quite to the contrary, it indicates that the cultural premises of 
acceptability contained in scientific and technical statements on risk are wrong’ (Beck, 
1992: 58). Rejection of alternative knowledge-systems is what Goldman terms 
‘epistemic violence’, or the ‘subjugation of subaltern knowledges’ (Goldman, 2001: 
203), and Lakhani criticizes the EIA process in South Africa on exactly these grounds: 
 
There is an almost total lack of incorporating indigenous knowledge – even today, 
indigenous knowledge seems to be seen as only that relating to herbal remedies and 
plants and possibly some cultural information … The preponderance of importance 
placed on Northern / Western scientific knowledge, to the exclusion of all other 
knowledge, is a kind of scientific imperialism, which needs to change. We need to 
challenge the basic philosophical principles that guide Western capitalist thinking 
(Lakhani, 2001: #10). 
 
This fundamental reliance upon scientific expertise limits the resistance 
potential of techniques like EIA since, as Eden observes: ‘extended scientific 
knowledge may increase the number of players in the environmental policy debate but 
it will not change how the game is played’ (Eden, 1996: 195). However, through 
processes like EIA which specifically create space for public comment on, and 
criticism of, the premises and values underlying scientific expert conclusions, some 
undermining of dominant power relations is possible. The once-unquestioned 
 15 
authority of the ‘demigods in lab coats’ can be substantially eroded (Beck, 1992: 164). 
A healthy scepticism towards the expert should not, however, become a simplistic 
valorisation of greater public participation. 
 
 
Public Participation 
 
The internalization of governance through the creation of responsible eco-
citizens is a primary technique of eco-governmentality, and works through the 
discourse of public participation. NEMA states that ‘the participation of all interested 
and affected parties in environmental governance must be promoted’ (NEMA, 1998: 
2-4-f), and it is noted that the public participation part of the EIA process is the only 
part for which no exemptions can be applied (Olver, 2004: 8). In the Koeberg EIA 
over 2,600 I&APs were registered and involved in the programme, including NGOs, 
residents, businesses, various government levels and professional institutions (Poltech, 
2002: 4). The authorities were satisfied that ‘the public participation process followed 
as part of the EIA process conformed to the requirement of the regulations’ (Olver, 
2003: 9). It was this point that was contested by Earthlife Africa through the courts, 
with the charge that ‘insufficient information was put forward by Eskom to enable any 
meaningful participation’.7 
Earthlife Africa’s central claim in the High Court was that their efforts to 
obtain access to relevant documents were repeatedly denied, and they were not 
allowed a proper hearing from the decision-maker, the Director-General of DEAT. 
According to the judge, the Director-General did not consider the extensive 
submissions made by Earthlife Africa on the draft EIR when reaching his decision 
(Griesel, 2005: #12, #15 and #18). The final EIR was not made available to I&APs for 
comment on, despite being ‘substantially different’ from the draft, with the Director-
General unambiguously stating that Earthlife Africa ‘cannot comment on the final 
EIR as they had an opportunity to previously comment on the draft’. The judge found 
this to be in contradiction to the spirit of the EIA regulations, which ‘provide for full 
public participation in all the relevant procedures contemplated in these regulations’ 
(#56, #58 and #59). Others involved with the process also criticized Eskom’s 
openness and provision of information (Thomas, 2004: 8 – 9 and 38; Fig, 2004: 65). 
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In this case Earthlife Africa won in the High Court because insufficient public 
participation was permitted by Eskom. However, a Foucauldian approach cautions 
against the simplistic belief that more participation equals a greater resistance 
potential. In particular we must consider who participates, what sort of participation is 
occurring, and the effects upon power relations.  
Consultants hired by the developer are required to advertise public meetings, 
invite groups to register themselves as I&APs, and disseminate information to these 
groups (Poltech, 2002: 375 – 384). In this case Earthlife Africa were the most 
prominent I&AP, but other environmental groups also participated in public meetings, 
including the Endangered Wildlife Trust, and the Wildlife and Environment Society 
of South Africa (Kupka, 2001). Local community involvement was more patchy – the 
original protesters against the Koeberg nuclear facility in the late 1970s were 
apparently estate agents concerned about impacts on property values in the upper 
middle class white suburb of Duynefontein, and far better able to represent themselves 
than residents of nearby Atlantis, ‘a bleak dormitory settlement on the West coast, 
established by the apartheid government to house working class Coloured people 
employed in low paid government-subsidised industries’ (Fig, 2004: 30). Since then, 
however, engagements with and protests against Eskom’s nuclear developments have 
mushroomed: 
 
The proposal to develop the PBMR has regalvanised the anti-nuclear movement in 
South Africa as never before. The focus of the movement has spread rapidly from 
Koeberg to a critique of all aspects of the nuclear fuel chain. Its epicentre has 
extended from the Western Cape to embrace campaigns in Gauteng, North-West, 
Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Residents of Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, 
Diepsloot, Brits, Pelindaba, Atlantis, Table View, and various Namaqualand 
communities have begun to mobilise more actively. The campaign has also been 
taken to the port of Durban, entry point for future imports of enriched uranium, and 
communities all along the N3 highway to Pelindaba (66). 
 
Whilst this is encouraging from the point of view of environmental resistance, there 
were problems with the participatory process. Lakhani notes that the National Union 
of Mineworkers (an Eskom union) was not invited to the EIA focus group stage, and 
alleges that the overall number of registered I&APs was relatively small, the same as 
that for a powerline in Gauteng province (Lakhani, 2001: #2 and #5).  
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Perhaps more significantly, the whole notion of participation as advanced in 
some ‘social learning’ perspectives is theoretically underdeveloped, and tends to posit 
a monolithic, homogenous state against a relatively unified ‘civil society’ consisting 
of discrete but homogenous, static and harmonious ‘communities’ (Wilkins, 2003: 
402; O’Riordan, 1996: 145). This understanding of communities is simplistic, and 
straightforward appeals for community participation tend to conceal the power 
relationships and diversity of interests within communities (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 
6). In the Koeberg process it was noted that ‘no provision has been made for balanced 
input at the workshops, or for effective access for (previously) disadvantaged 
communities’ (Worthington, 2000: 27). Thus ‘opportunities to engage with a 
decision-making process enable relatively privileged groups to defend their position 
against the interests of less articulate communities’ (Connelly and Richardson, 2005: 
404). The identification and involvement of I&APs in the EIA process is usually an 
unproblematised, under-theorised, bureaucratic process of groups identifying and 
submitting themselves in response to media announcements of an upcoming 
assessment, and the democratic accountability of these groups is highly questionable 
(Poltech, 2002: 377; Mason, 2005: 59 – 65).  
Even when involved in the process, an equal voice for all participants is 
impossible. According to the South African Government, public participation means 
‘furnishing interested and affected parties and the public with an opportunity to 
comment on, or raise issues relevant to’ environmental policies (Olver, 2004: 8). This 
provision makes no promises that public comments will be listened to or even 
considered in the decision-making stage. There have been allegations that some 
voices are being ignored or stifled in the process, for example in the power 
relationships between local and national government: 
 
Until recently a number of Cape Town city councillors have expressed disquiet about 
the PBMR plans. The city council was highly critical of the EIA report’s conclusion 
that the PBMR would have ‘no significant environmental risks or adverse impacts’. 
However, following DEAT’s conditional approval of the EIA, and the summoning to 
Pretoria of some critical councillors, the city has been much quieter on this question, 
and there has been speculation that the national government has instructed it to accept 
the project, or at least defer criticism until after the April 2004 elections (Fig, 2004: 
66). 
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Thus EIAs can draw upon certain opinions, thereby legitimating the process by 
invoking ‘public’ participation, only to then stifle or ignore those views at the 
decision-making stage. EJNF warn I&APs to be aware of ‘planning decisions 
happening behind closed doors and EIAs being used to justify projects’ (EJNF, 2004a: 
14). Despite opposition from the environmental groups involved in the EIA, the 
Koeberg development was approved by DEAT. By participating in the EIA at all, 
Earthlife Africa and others were legitimating a process that may have anyway had a 
pre-determined outcome. This is suggested by the fact that by mid-2000 over 120 
million Rand had been directly spent on the project in ‘a history of intensive state 
subsidy’ (Worthington, 2000: 5 – 7). Eskom state on their website that the South 
African Government committed ‘a significant amount’ of funding to the project in the 
2004 mid-term budget, and that ‘the Minister of Public Enterprises, Mr Alec Erwin, 
stated an intent to eventually produce 4000 MW to 5000 MW of power from pebble 
bed reactors in South Africa’.8 In the aftermath of Earthlife Africa’s court victory, 
Eskom have scaled up the PBMR development and begun a new EIA process 
(Mawatsan, 2006). Without a broader debate on nuclear power, the result of Earthlife 
Africa’s resistance may have only been to delay rather than block the development, 
and in so doing legitimate the EIA process.  
Theorists warn that ‘bureaucratic agencies can turn participation techniques 
into tools for citizen co-optation’ (Bartlett and Kurian, 1999: 423), and that ‘the very 
act of inclusion, of being drawn in as a participant, can symbolize the exercise of 
power and control over an individual’ (Kothari, 2001: 142). By implication therefore, 
a refusal to participate becomes an act of irresponsibility, and there is ‘an implicit 
notion of deviancy for those who choose not to participate’ (148). Furthermore, the 
extension of participation also implies some shifting of responsibility from the state-
national-structural level to the community-individual level, and thus ‘an emphasis on 
the micro level of intervention can obscure, and indeed sustain, broader macro level 
inequalities and injustice’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 14). Whilst this in one context 
can be (rightly) seen as empowering, it also works to absolve institutions of 
responsibility, as well as excuse them from inaction on larger scale problems such as 
global warming or the disposal of radioactive waste, which cannot be solely dealt with 
on an individual level. 
The manifold power relationships and vested interests involved in EIA 
processes tend to undermine the optimism of EIA practitioners and theorists that 
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‘through the use of reason and understanding, compromises on plans and work 
towards solutions which all sides can accept may be achieved’ (Wilkins, 2003: 408; 
see also Bartlett and Kurian, 1999: 422; and Kakonge, 1998: 297). Whilst there may 
be a procedural value to greater participation, this is not a sufficient condition for 
consensus on political issues. For Adams, the stress on participation is evidence of a 
naïve failure to ‘address the political economy of the development process’ and 
consider concrete issues of the inequality of resource distribution (Adams, 2001: 115). 
Such arguments are frequently and forcefully stated by opponents of 
participatory or reformist resistance, such as Patrick Bond who concludes that 
‘militancy pays, it seems, because mild-mannered lobbying and project- or policy-
wonk inputs by experts are, simply, incapable of raising the costs of business as usual’, 
and that ‘reformist and technicist critiques … are clearly insufficient to foster 
momentum for change’ (Bond, 2002: 415 and 420). These critiques tend to polarise 
tactics as either radical, where ‘militant environmentalists present sweeping critiques 
of contemporary society, live lives which challenge widespread assumptions about 
meaningful experience, and undertake actions which concretely enfeeble forces which 
harm the Earth’; or reformist, which involve ‘compromising principles in an effort to 
gain political legitimacy and to be pragmatic within a context of plausible policy 
options’ (Wapner, 1995: 301 – 304). From this perspective, Earthlife Africa’s 
reformist opposition did more harm than good.  
Despite this, there is still a sense that a stated commitment to participation 
may well open up some sort of political space for resistance: even Uma Kothari 
remains hopeful that ‘there is a possibility of resistance or subversion through 
people’s performances in participatory exercises’ (Kothari, 2001: 151). There is the 
possibility that the discursive spaces which participatory processes open up can be 
used in ways that are unexpected, and that undermine existing power relations. The 
openness of liberal governmentality to internal critique is both its greatest strength 
and greatest weakness. 
 
 
Bearing Witness 
 
 Despite the inadequacies of the EIA processes, their reliance upon established 
scientific discourses and experts, and the inability of participatory techniques to 
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overcome established power relationships, it remains clear that Earthlife Africa did 
significantly disrupt Eskom’s nuclear programme, and has introduced alternative 
dimensions (environmental, social, and health) to the nuclear debate that may threaten 
the project’s overall future (Thomas, 2004: 11). The November 2004 court case was 
highly visible, as was recognised by the judge: ‘the very sensitive and controversial 
issue of nuclear power, which potentially affects the safety and environmental rights 
of vast numbers of people … has generated considerable local and national interest’ 
(Griesel, 2005: #32). Furthermore, the EIR acknowledged that: 
 
a proportion of the public have little faith in the ability of regulatory mechanisms or 
Eskom’s assurances that members of the public are at no significant risk to 
radioactivity. For this reason, Eskom’s visible compliance with the measures for 
ensuring that the public is at no significant risk is deemed to be of utmost importance.  
It is required that such compliance is made ‘visible’ to surrounding communities on a 
participative basis through the development of a community-based environmental 
indicators project (Poltech, 2002: 74). 
 
Through this demand for visibility, EIAs do potentially provide an opportunity for 
various groups to contest developments on different grounds from those usually 
debated. This is a form of bearing witness, the strategic approach of environmental 
groups like Greenpeace.9 It rests on the assumption that ‘having observed a morally 
objectionable act, one cannot turn away in avoidance. One must either take action to 
prevent further injustice or stand by and attest to its occurrence’ (Wapner, 1995: 307). 
Bearing witness is a central part of the discourse of environmental justice, which 
seeks to introduce considerations of justice and morality into the technical and 
instrumental discourse of the scientist and environmental manager. 
By the act of assessing and measuring environmental (and social) impacts of 
developments, developers and the state implicitly take responsibility for those impacts. 
It is possible for them to cover-up, or not act upon the assessments they receive, but 
having carried out an assessment they have no justification for avoiding their 
conclusions. South African environmentalists stress that the ‘government is not 
allowed to ignore what an EIA says about the negative impacts on the environment’ 
(EJNF, 2004a: 13). Assessments may be flawed, narrow-minded and partial, but they 
open up the fields of environmental and social impacts as possible sites of 
contestation and resistance. Beck observes that what cannot be predicted cannot be 
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prevented, and conversely by attempting to predict impacts (through an EIA) there is 
an assertion of the desire to control and prevent (Beck, 1992: 34). This is certainly an 
extension of the modern ‘will to power’ whereby, according to Descartes, humans are 
‘lords and possessors of Nature’ (quoted in Lanthier and Olivier, 1999: 67), but an 
assertion of such control means thereafter it is impossible to avoid action (or 
conversely blame for damaging consequences arising from inaction). In this sense 
bearing witness is itself a form of governmentality, but one which, to paraphrase 
Foucault, is not necessarily bad, but certainly dangerous (Foucault, 1997b: 256). One 
of its strengths, but also one potential danger, is specifically the moral and ethical 
element of the environmental justice discourse. Although this is positive in relation to 
the apparently amoral, technocratic and instrumentalist rationality of techniques of 
eco-governmentality, it can always threaten to descend into the antagonistic and 
absolutist language of right and wrong, or good and evil (Harvey, 1999: 175 – 176). 
 Arguments over the resistance potential of certain tactics and strategies tend to 
oscillate between those favouring reform, and those preferring revolution. The 
resistance potential of processes like EIA raise this question directly, since they 
represent a modernist desire to monitor, predict and control. Low and Gleeson ask ‘if 
modernity is characterized by the striving for control over nature and people, and 
modernity, with its increased capacity for control, is also producing the ecological 
crisis, then how can we possibly resolve the crisis by adding more control?’ (Low and 
Gleeson, 2001: 9) Yet an outright rejection of modernity is clearly impossible, since 
‘philosophers have made us aware that we cannot describe the period in which we 
happen to live, since it is from within its rules that we speak and think, and since it 
provides the basis for our descriptions and our own history’ (Escobar, 1995: 215). In 
working through the law courts and with the government, Earthlife Africa are clearly 
not revolutionaries, but neither can they be described as fully co-opted. Likewise, 
EIAs are neither a clear-cut tool of counter-capitalist resistance, nor an ineffectual 
example of corporate greenwashing. As Foucault advised in response to precisely the 
same debate over reform versus revolution: 
 
We need to escape the dilemma of being either for or against. One can, after all, be 
face to face, and upright [debout et en face]. Working with a government doesn’t 
imply either a subjection or a blanket acceptance. One can work with and be 
intransigent at the same time (Foucault, 2000c: 455 – 456). 
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Conclusion 
 
The future role of nuclear power in global sustainable development, and 
particularly in the development of the industrialising countries, is contentious and the 
debate is often highly emotive. The World Bank’s policy on nuclear energy is 
sceptical, refusing to fund nuclear power plants because of their costs and risks, and 
labelling them ‘white elephants’ (Worthington, 2000: 19). Yet with the mounting 
evidence of human-induced global climate change many governments and even 
environmentalists have begun to reconsider nuclear power as a potentially cleaner 
alternative to fossil fuels. However, the unresolved issue of radioactive waste disposal, 
as was highlighted by Earthlife Africa in their comments on the Koeberg EIA process, 
remains problematic, and environmental justice activists have warned against the 
exploitation of poorer countries as the dumping ground for the industrialised world’s 
nuclear waste (18; see also Fig, 2004: chapter 6; and Lakhani, 2002: 24). Doubts over 
the safety record of PBMR technology, and the existing reactors at Koeberg (re-
ignited by the reactor shutdown in December 2005), also stir up the recurring spectre 
of nuclear catastrophe, and questions over whether the benefits of nuclear power 
outweigh the risks of another Chernobyl or Three Mile Island. The Koeberg PBMR 
development could well be a focal point for the nuclear debate not only in South 
Africa, but also for the future role of the nuclear industry in Africa, other 
industrialising countries, and in global sustainable development. 
Given the environmental justice discourse’s antipathy to nuclear power, the 
blocking of the Koeberg development by Earthlife Africa can appear at first as a 
successful example of environmental resistance against a modernist and capitalist 
drive for power (quite literally). However, by re-thinking the nature of political power 
through an engagement with Foucault, the EIA process can be re-interpreted as an 
example of a modernist rationality of control and manipulation, or eco-
governmentality. In the types of scientific knowledge it relied upon, and the technical 
scope which excluded broader policy, safety or waste disposal questions, the Koeberg 
EIA reinforced existing power relationships, whereby expert knowledge renders lay 
knowledge invalid, and political issues are reduced to technical problems. Moreover, 
the limits on access to information, lack of influence upon decision-making, and 
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potential for legitimising development through the co-opting of opposition complicate 
what is often simplistically presumed to be a straightforward correlation between 
greater public participation and resistance. Despite these caveats, Earthlife Africa’s 
challenge has again raised the nuclear debate in South Africa, as well as setting higher 
standards for openness and debate during the EIA process, and thus may be seen as a 
form of resistance through bearing witness. The balance of achieving effective 
environmental resistance, whilst neither becoming co-opted by existing power 
relationships nor becoming irrelevant, is extremely difficult, far more so than is often 
assumed. Earthlife Africa’s temporary and partial success can only be furthered by a 
broader South African national debate over the future role of nuclear power, together 
with some serious qualifications of the degree to which environmental organisations 
accept the EIA process itself. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 www.earthlife.org.za 
2 www.pbmr.co.za  
3 Ibid 
4 http://www.earthlife-ct.org.za/ct/article.php?story=20040603224901422, accessed 5 September 2005. 
5 Most World Bank development projects are now required to have EIAs conducted on them, and 
environmental science graduate degrees are widespread (Luke, 1999a).   
6 See the qualifications of, and limits to, the report’s scope (Poltech, 2002: ii, vii – viii, x – xi, 2, 31 – 
32, 63 – 65, 67 – 69, 191, and 350). Interestingly, the report does cover some broader issues, such as 
HIV/Aids and the development’s impact upon tourism. 
7 http://www.earthlife-ct.org.za/ct/article.php?story=20050620002516883 accessed 31 August 2005. 
8 www.pbmr.co.za  
9 http://www.greenpeace.org/international/about/our-mission  
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